The question isn't where the plane was. We know it was generally along Victor 23 for most of the trip south from Seattle. The question is when did Cooper jump. The flight crew reported oscillations between 8:10 and 8:12. At this point, they stated that "he must be doing something with the stairs". We have no documented record of when the pressure bump occurred. No time stamp, nothing. All we have are the statements of the pilots after the fact : "lights of the suburbs of Portland", "10 to 15 minutes after last contact".
As a result, the jump could have occurred anywhere between Orchards and the Columbia.
The fact that the money was found along the Columbia upstream from where the plane crossed over is in my mind a clue that he jumped near the Columbia.
Chaucer: Refresh me on how you get Orchards as the northern most jump point and not Battle Ground. Also, are you saying there was no pressure bump, or that there were oscillations and a pressure bump, or that there was a pressure bump but we don't know the time?
The pressure bump conversation predates you by quite a bit, so it is not a new theory, I'm just wondering about it and figured it would be a good question.
I'm going by the time along the flight path.
8:05 was the last time the flight crew hear from Cooper when he responded to them on the intercom that "everything was OK"
8:10 was the first time there are any reports of "oscillations" (FBI Vault, Part 41, p. 31 & 32)
8:12 was the last time there are any reports of "oscillations".(FBI Vault, Part 41, p. 31 & 32) At this point the plane was just east of LaCenter.
There is no official report of a "pressure bump" which is generally used as the point at which Cooper jumped causing the stairs to swing back up. We don't know when that took place, but we know it took place AFTER 8:12 because the oscillations preceded the pressure bump.
So, while we don't have an exact time of the pressure bump, we do have pilot statements. Rat said initially that the pressure bump was felt 5 to 10 minutes after last contact (8:05). That would put the bump between 8:10 and 8:15. We know it can't be between 8:10 and 8:12 because that is when the oscillations are happening. So it would have to happen between 8:13 and 8:15. However, Rat later told Carr that the pressure bump occurred 10 to 15 minutes after last contact (8:05). This would give you a range between 8:15 and 8:20 for the pressure bump.
However, further statements by the crew were that the pressure bump occurred when "the lights of the suburbs of Portland were visible" but they "had not yet crossed the Columbia. The plane crossed over the Columbia at 8:17, so we can eliminate any bump happening after 8:17.
Thus, the timing of the oscillations combined with the statements of the pilot give a range between 8:13 and 8:17 for Cooper jumping and causing the pressure bump. The median of this time range is 8:15. At 8:15 the plane is over the Orchards area.
In actuality, the northernmost jump point IS just north of Battleground and the southernmost would be the northern banks of the Columbia. I used Orchards as a center between the two.
My contention is that the jump occurred in the 8:16/8:17 time frame and Cooper and/or the money came to rest very near the banks of the Columbia.
Sorry that was so wordy. I'll be happy to clarify anything.
Hominid & Georger Telephone interviews with Andy Anderson: Tuesday Jan 28, 2014 â
Georger,
Thank you for entertaining my questions.
NWA documents indicate that, at approximately 8:11pm PST, an event occurred which was described by an NWA incident report as "oscillation of cabin rate of climb indicator." The event occurred just after the flight was advised of weather at Reno and "Reno looks better as time goes by" per a TTY based log. This log (that appears to be an attempt by a non-aviation person to type all he thought he was hearing) also included "Must be doing something with air stairs" immediately after the "oscillations" report.
Oscillation of the cabin climb rate gauge seems reasonable. It is conceivable that the oscillation could be just an indication that the airstair moving up and down was directly causing pressure cycles. It is more likely that the pressure cycles resulted from the plane bobbing up and down a bit ("porpoising") as a result of the airstair functioning as an elevator as it moved up and down in the airstream. It could have been that the hijacker was doing something like jumping up and down on the airstair to test its "feel" or to try to get the stair locked down.
It seems very unlikely that the "oscillation" and "doing something with air stairs" would be reference to a pressure pulse felt in ears, or the airstair-ajar enunciator light going out momentarily.
Q1: Andy, Who on the flight crew made the oscillation report?
A: Rataczak filed the report, based on my observations. But he did not report it immediately as we discussed it for some minutes then Bill (R) radioed it in to NWA.
Q2: Is it correct that the intent of the report from the crew was that the cabin climb rate guage indication had oscillated?
A: It was the "rate of descent" gauge that detected the so-called "pressure bump." Two guages are used to detect the disruptions of airflow. (1) the Differential Pressure/Cabin Altitude (which serves as a dual function guage); and (2) rate of climb, or, rate of descent guage.
If so:
Q3: Approximately how many pressure (climb rate) cycles (up-downs) occurred?
A: Do not specifically recall, but it wasnât a one time event but a series of fluctuations which attracted our attention. I saw it first then alerted Scott and Bill, ending in a single pressure event we felt in our ears, and nothing following, not even more fluctuations. We waited to see if something more would happen but it didnât.
Q4: Approximately what was the rate or time span per cycle? (e.g., a second per cycle)
A: I just donât recall. I would have to think about that and estimate it.
Q5: Was there a feeling of the plane bobbing up and down? [Bill Rataczak has been quoted as saying something like: at some point there was a sudden pressure pulse felt in the ears, that the enunciator light went out momentarily, there was a "bump" of the airframe, and that he immediately told ATC that he thought the hijacker had "taken leave" of the plane. All of this seems likely. Regarding the later test flight, it has been reported that someone on the flight confirmed that the pressure pulse that was felt (when a weighted sled was released) was the same as what occurred during the hijacking.]
A: Q5. Not really and it wasnât exactly as you describe. These were minor oscillations. We detected on the gauges only. We just presumed pretty quickly that it was Cooper fiddling with the aft stairs but we werenât one hundred percent sure because we were already flying dirty, with throttles up and fighting icing and weather. A lot going on and it wasnât totally smooth even before the oscillations started. What we noticed was the pattern of the oscillations was continuing and there was a very minor disruption of the slipstream. Scott said at first he wasnât feeling anything for sure, then a little later he thought there was more drag and the nose was deviating a little. When the final bump happened and the oscillations stopped that sealed it. But even then we werenât sure and we waited before calling anybody.
Q6: Was it you who confirmed that the pressure pulse of the test flight seemed the same as what was felt during the hijacked flight?
A: Yes, I was the only original crew member on board the re-test.
Q7: Which (if any) of the above characterizations attributed to Bill can you confirm?
A: All. [broke for a minute for Andy to get some coffee].
Q8: What can you recall about when the pressure pulse event occurred during the hijacking? Was it at the end of the "oscillations"? A few seconds after them? A minute after? [One of the airforce guys (Msgt Saiz) who went out on the stair told me that he jumped up and down on the stair at some point to test how the plane would react. Of course, he was able to experience how the stair responded, but not how the plane responded. The other two still-living airforce people have no memory of this.]
A: I monitored the gauges and reported to Captain Scott. We all agreed that the gauges were detecting a disruption of airflow, most likely caused by Cooper testing out the aft stairs. But we all felt one physically distinguishable "bump" with our ears which came abruptly after we had been monitoring the gauges. We all felt it almost in unison, surprised, "there he goes!" It was the largest bump by far, an abrupt pressure change. We all thought he had exited the aircraft at that point, because the gauges never detected any further major airflow disruptions after that âthudâ. The re-test duplicated the oscillations and the pressure bump exactly.
Q9: Were you aware of one of the stair-walkers jumping up and down on the stair? Did you experience the plane's reaction? If so, what was it? [Among multiple sources from NWA, there are references to the "oscillations" event. But there are absolutely no references to a pressure pulse, the enunciator light going out, or "took leave of us." After the "oscillations" event was logged by teletype at 8:12 and seconds, the next teletype-logged communication (sent at 8:20 and seconds) was:
305 CALLED
MSP FLT OPNS GO TO 131.8
SEADD HE IS ALREADY ON THAT FREQ
MSP R. WE [are] ON [t]HE PHONE WND [and] WILL BE TAL[k]ING TO HIM SHORTLY
SEADD R.
This is the last TTY logged communication we have. There was an 8-minute absence of communications in the TTY log preceding it. The 131.8 frequency was set up (with ARINC?) about the time the flight was taking off from SEATAC, with a notation "after company" (frequency).]:
A: Don't recall specifically. I believe it was only registered on the pressure and descent gauges. I donât know anything about teletype matters or who did what to keep track at NWA?
Q10: Did the flight crew report the pressure pulse immediately after it happened? If so, over what comm circuit?
A: Thatâs a good question because we may have reported the oscillations/pressure changes once, but we were busy and didnât report it multiple times. We werenât sure what was going on. When the final bump happened, which we detected with our ears, we were surprised, and we didnât report it right away. Rataczak finally reported the bump via radio.
Q11: Why do you think a frequency was set up for use after the "company" frequency? [I've been unable to get a manual for the NWA 727s of the period, but have info from 3 other airlines. From this it seems that the procedure that was provided by Boeing to the flight crew for allowing the hijacker out via the aft airstair would have included disabling the hydraulic power to the airstair (probably by pulling the circuit breaker in the cockpit) so that the hijacker wouldn't be able to power the stair to the full-down position (and lock it there).
A: I donât recall the specifics of this. Our cockpit was in communication with NWA and ATC. Not FBI.
Q12: Did the procedure include disabling the airstair hydraulic power?
A: We didn't want to disable the airstairs by defusing electrical power to hydraulic actuators. We wanted the bastard to get off our ship ASAP.
Q13: Did Paul Soderlind sit in the copilot seat during the test flight?
A: Yes, I believe that's correct.
Q14: Who was the NWA instrumentation man who stood behind the rest of the group in the pic?
A: Do not recall.
Q15: Who was the FBI agent standing beside you in the test group photo? (holding the manila envelope and apparently a jacket in addition to the raincoat he was wearing)
A: Do not recall.
Q16: Who was the heavier agent kneeling down in front of you two, in dark clothes?
A: Too long ago, can't recall.
Q17: Who was on the test flight other than the 12 people in the group pic?
A: Don't specifically recall. Maybe some other Air Force people. Yes, a couple I think.
Q18: Is there anything else you consider significant to the question of where the hijacker jumped?
A: It was very dark, with virtually no ground reference except when we got in the Portland area. We bounced around the clouds, with occasional breaks. The 727âs slipstream initially overcame the aft stairs hydraulic system. The stairs werenât opening like Cooper needed. Cooper called me on the interphone while Tina was riding up front with us. Cooper had let Tina come to the front. He yelled, "slow it down!." I stated back to Cooper, "OK." And we did; we slowed the plane. The oscillations continued, as I remember, but were smoother and we hadnât heard anything from Cooper. Bill called back to him and he finally answered. He said everything was âOKâ. More time passed. And then suddenly came that âbumpâ. After the final "bump" which we felt with our ears, we all discussed it for awhile, waiting for another bump. It never repeated, so we assumed that was his exit. But we discussed this among ourselves before notifying NWA. The truth is, we just didn't know for sure. I just don't recall how much time lapsed between feeling the final "bump" and reporting it to NWA via radio. Thatâs where the uncertainty has come from.
But later we all thought that final bump was his exit.
[end of Part I interview]