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Whoa, Raoul - you think DBC walked along the Lewis and the Columbia for, hmmm, sixteen miles or so in the dark? Some stretches of those waterways are in terrain that is basically impenetrable. In fact, Lower River Road does not go north much past T-Bar because the land is too marshy and unsuitable for a roadway, so it never gets to the Lewis-Columbia confluence. Further, I know of no stretches of the Lewis where anyone can walk for more than a half-mile or so in any unencumbered manner.

Your general premise though, is widely accepted, but most aficionados substitute a boat for hoofing it. Grey Cop and others tout this scenario.

On the flip side, what do you think of a ground team with full comm gear extracting DBC in a more timely fashion - all before they get breakfast at a local diner....

1. I didn't mean that he necessarily made the whole trip that night. May have taken him a couple days to reach that point south of Tina Bar. Of course, that's insinuating he had the means to survive outside in the elements for that long.

2. I didn't know how thick the terrain might be. Was thinking it may be more favorable the closer to the river you get, perhaps some exposed banks if the water level is low. As an east coaster, I'll certainly take your word for it though.

Again, consensus is Cooper was a technical guy with a plan and had some knowledge of the area from Portland to Seattle (from the air). In my opinion if he wasn't injured he wasted no time getting back to the Portland area asap.

Have you checked the ground weather conditions that night and lack of moonlight after about 8:00pm? Suggest you do that. Facts matter.

 

Those things matter no matter how he planned to get out. No matter how technical he was, there was still an element of landing, getting his bearings straight and then getting himself to safety (or getting the safety to come to him) in dark, cold and wet conditions. So unless he landed in the back of a waiting convertible, the conditions and lighting were factors for any theory of escape.

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Here's a whatif -

If the crew had known they were flying a route or over terrain not safe for a person to jump, do you think the crew would have tried to convince Cooper not to bail when it was clear "he's going to jump" ! ? 

Did Cooper know 'they knew' he was wanting to jump? Did he adjust accordingly? How?

Was Cooper's jump an act of reciprocity? What advantage does this give Cooper?

 

*These questions bare on Carr's assertion that Cooper had no idea where he was when he bailed - had no way of knowing (anything).

Basically, there was not any "safe" terrain that the flight crew could have known about in the first place and they did not have visual sight of the ground due to the darkness plus several cloud layers and overcast.  The flight crew was using Instrument Flight Rules charts that did not show topographical information.  Consequently, the flight crew did not have any better knowledge of what the terrain was beneath the airliner than Cooper did.  And in view of the circumstances, the flight crew was not under any legal or moral obligation to do anything to keep Cooper from busting his butt.

After obtaining four parachutes, and with Tina having observed him tying the money bag to his waist after putting on a back pack parachute, it is a given that Cooper was going to jump.  There was no way for Cooper to fool the crew on that point. 

Getting Cooper and the bomb off the aircraft was definitely to the benefit of the crew.  And Cooper getting himself safely on the ground would have definitely been to his benefit.  But I doubt if these qualify as an act of reciprocity.

In my opinion, Carr is right and Cooper could not have had any useful information as to his location when he jumped.  And, apparently, neither did the flight crew.

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Here's a whatif -

If the crew had known they were flying a route or over terrain not safe for a person to jump, do you think the crew would have tried to convince Cooper not to bail when it was clear "he's going to jump" ! ? 

Did Cooper know 'they knew' he was wanting to jump? Did he adjust accordingly? How?

Was Cooper's jump an act of reciprocity? What advantage does this give Cooper?

 

*These questions bare on Carr's assertion that Cooper had no idea where he was when he bailed - had no way of knowing (anything).

Basically, there was not any "safe" terrain that the flight crew could have known about in the first place and they did not have visual sight of the ground due to the darkness plus several cloud layers and overcast.  The flight crew was using Instrument Flight Rules charts that did not show topographical information.  Consequently, the flight crew did not have any better knowledge of what the terrain was beneath the airliner than Cooper did.  And in view of the circumstances, the flight crew was not under any legal or moral obligation to do anything to keep Cooper from busting his butt.

After obtaining four parachutes, and with Tina having observed him tying the money bag to his waist after putting on a back pack parachute, it is a given that Cooper was going to jump.  There was no way for Cooper to fool the crew on that point. 

Getting Cooper and the bomb off the aircraft was definitely to the benefit of the crew.  And Cooper getting himself safely on the ground would have definitely been to his benefit.  But I doubt if these qualify as an act of reciprocity.

In my opinion, Carr is right and Cooper could not have had any useful information as to his location when he jumped.  And, apparently, neither did the flight crew.

Do we really know who chose (or why) V23 became the route of choice. There were choices.
V23 favors all tactical parameters for a plane carrying a bomb. It favors a low altitude jump and getting the hijacker on with his mission, in as expeditious way as possible. The bomb is a powerful determiner in all aspects of this case if people actually chose to think and plan in terms of that (Im not saying they did). Nyrop had said to "cooperate". Nyrop was following the straightest path (simplest solution) to a goal, given a problem. In addition you can almost bet Nyrop turned to his technical people for a technical solution involving a flight path.

In these ways there was reciprocity, conscious or unconscious.

Would Cooper depend or count in any way upon all of this happening out of Seattle? No, not if he was a rational player.

Something has the official side of this case stuck on V23. I am suspicious that V23 was ordered or agreed upon at some point early, on the ground at Seattle. What then happened is another subject for another time - but it might be worth noting that when it comes to simple solutions Toldeo to Canby fits this model of efficiency. Perhaps it started with V23 then was simplified further to expedite matters ( Toldedo to Canby ... all at the behest of ... Soderlind/Nyrop?).

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Here's a whatif -

If the crew had known they were flying a route or over terrain not safe for a person to jump, do you think the crew would have tried to convince Cooper not to bail when it was clear "he's going to jump" ! ? 

Did Cooper know 'they knew' he was wanting to jump? Did he adjust accordingly? How?

Was Cooper's jump an act of reciprocity? What advantage does this give Cooper?

 

*These questions bare on Carr's assertion that Cooper had no idea where he was when he bailed - had no way of knowing (anything).

Basically, there was not any "safe" terrain that the flight crew could have known about in the first place and they did not have visual sight of the ground due to the darkness plus several cloud layers and overcast.  The flight crew was using Instrument Flight Rules charts that did not show topographical information.  Consequently, the flight crew did not have any better knowledge of what the terrain was beneath the airliner than Cooper did.  And in view of the circumstances, the flight crew was not under any legal or moral obligation to do anything to keep Cooper from busting his butt.

After obtaining four parachutes, and with Tina having observed him tying the money bag to his waist after putting on a back pack parachute, it is a given that Cooper was going to jump.  There was no way for Cooper to fool the crew on that point. 

Getting Cooper and the bomb off the aircraft was definitely to the benefit of the crew.  And Cooper getting himself safely on the ground would have definitely been to his benefit.  But I doubt if these qualify as an act of reciprocity.

In my opinion, Carr is right and Cooper could not have had any useful information as to his location when he jumped.  And, apparently, neither did the flight crew.

Do we really know who chose (or why) V23 became the route of choice. There were choices.
V23 favors all tactical parameters for a plane carrying a bomb. It favors a low altitude jump and getting the hijacker on with his mission, in as expeditious way as possible. The bomb is a powerful determiner in all aspects of this case if people actually chose to think and plan in terms of that (Im not saying they did). Nyrop had said to "cooperate". Nyrop was following the straightest path (simplest solution) to a goal, given a problem. In addition you can almost bet Nyrop turned to his technical people for a technical solution involving a flight path.

In these ways there was reciprocity, conscious or unconscious.

Would Cooper depend or count in any way upon all of this happening out of Seattle? No, not if he was a rational player.

Something has the official side of this case stuck on V23. I am suspicious that V23 was ordered or agreed upon at some point early, on the ground at Seattle. What then happened is another subject for another time - but it might be worth noting that when it comes to simple solutions Toldeo to Canby fits this model of efficiency. Perhaps it started with V23 then was simplified further to expedite matters ( Toldedo to Canby ... all at the behest of ... Soderlind/Nyrop?).

Georger,

In connection with your last paragraph, it should also be pointed out that the airliner flight crew, while on the ground at SEATAC, also communicated directly with NWA personnel there through NWA's own radio frequency.  There are apparently no transcripts available of those communications.  So what you are suggesting could easily have happened without leaving records.

Let me emphasize that the NWA radio frequency referred to above is different from the SEATAC tower ground control frequency that the airliner used to talk to the tower personnel while on the ground there.

And, for the record, Cooper never mentioned any airway according to the available transcripts and onboard notes.   

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... standing on the aft stairs looking forward into a 225 MPH wind with a wind chill factor of about 35 degrees below zero, I strongly suspect that he wasn't making the best mental calculations, if any at all.

R99, here you go again. Why do you persist in stating the wind chill as so severe? Where do you get this canard? More to the point, why don't you believe the skydivers who post here and at the DZ that the winds on the aft stairs was negligible. Hence, the wind chill would be virtually non-existent, too, making the ambient temp of 22 degree Fahrenheit the "wind chill temp," too.

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... standing on the aft stairs looking forward into a 225 MPH wind with a wind chill factor of about 35 degrees below zero, I strongly suspect that he wasn't making the best mental calculations, if any at all.

R99, here you go again. Why do you persist in stating the wind chill as so severe? Where do you get this canard? More to the point, why don't you believe the skydivers who post here and at the DZ that the winds on the aft stairs was negligible. Hence, the wind chill would be virtually non-existent, too, making the ambient temp of 22 degree Fahrenheit the "wind chill temp," too.

Ja. Vind onder stairs ver nicht vind onder stairs - das ist da queshtyon! 

And a partridge in a pear tree!