The T-33 pulling in behind 305 in the Woodland/Ridgefield area then trailing it basically due south would bring the airliner very close to Tena Bar, down along the west of downtown Portland, and ultimately right over the top of Lake Oswego.

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The T-33 pulling in behind 305 in the Woodland/Ridgefield area then trailing it basically due south would bring the airliner very close to Tena Bar, down along the west of downtown Portland, and ultimately right over the top of Lake Oswego.

What was Ammermann's controller number?  And was he and the rest of the SEA controllers south of Seattle all physically located in the Seattle area?

He was R4.

He took over from R2 just north of the Maylay Intersection. He ended up handing 305 over to R5 (I believe) at about the time everything was happening--meaning the T-33 was pulling in behind 305, the F-106's were being directed further east, and coincidentally DBC jumped. Ammerman told me he made the transfer of his own choice because it was too difficult for him to communicate with everyone while being careful to toggle the switch so as to guarantee that his communication with the military jets wasn't being transmitted to the 305 cockpit because, as Ammerman stated, he didn't know if DBC was in the cockpit.

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The T-33 pulling in behind 305 in the Woodland/Ridgefield area then trailing it basically due south would bring the airliner very close to Tena Bar, down along the west of downtown Portland, and ultimately right over the top of Lake Oswego.

What was Ammermann's controller number?  And was he and the rest of the SEA controllers south of Seattle all physically located in the Seattle area?

He was R4.

He took over from R2 just north of the Maylay Intersection. He ended up handing 305 over to R5 (I believe) at about the time everything was happening--meaning the T-33 was pulling in behind 305, the F-106's were being directed further east, and coincidentally DBC jumped. Ammerman told me he made the transfer of his own choice because it was too difficult for him to communicate with everyone while being careful to toggle the switch so as to guarantee that his communication with the military jets wasn't being transmitted to the 305 cockpit because, as Ammerman stated, he didn't know if DBC was in the cockpit.

The Seattle ATC radio transcripts do not list a controller SEA R4.

The transcripts list a SEA R2, SEA R5, SEA R6, and SEA R10.

At what point do we accept the radar returns or the operator's? for years R99 went against the Air Force map claiming bad returns and distance. "the red dots" now, we appear to be taking the word of the radar operator and the radar? Ammerman even stated the map looked correct? I think he would of stated the same back then...

I think the FBI failed to speak with the operator's since they had a map and other statements from operator's in Portland which get shot down very quick, like the map..Portland was more involved for many reasons IMO..

This is where we have to be very careful and precise with what people are saying and why.

Ammerman saying he would not, or could not, dispute the FBI Flight Path map is because it is within the range of possibilities. Meaning, his display showed a line that the jet was on. This line could be several miles in length. Therefore, he does not know with absolute certainty precisely where 305 is at any given moment--rather he has a general idea. This is also why he cannot be certain that 305 didn't stray outside of V-23 by a few miles to the west because this too is part of that range of possible locations for the jet.

Additionally, I specifically asked Ammerman about the turns around Vancouver, PDX and downtown Portland--which strike me as some dude leaving an all night kegger rather than a pilot concerned about a bomb falling off the seat in the back and accidentally detonating or a tense skyjacker interpreting such flight movements as "funny stuff."

Ammerman said that such turns were too small for him to really notice them on his radar screen. Therefore, he cannot say that they didn't happen. This is materially different than suggesting that Ammerman said it did happen.

As to the Portland controller and what he apparently saw, it is definitely an interesting thing to consider. Specifically, I would be interested to know how he is certain that among the four planes in close proximity that night that he was sure he was observing the airliner and not one of the other jets? Also, I would be interested to know how it is that he can attest with such accuracy where the jet flew at this particular point, days after the fact?

Remember, no one knew that Cooper was going to jump in this area, thereby causing everyone to pay close attention as the jet approached Vancouver. Rather, it was only later that they determined Cooper jumped in that area, and now you apparently have a controller saying, "Oh yes, I recall exactly where the aircraft flew at that exact point" days later. How?

I'm not saying it's impossible. I am saying it would be remarkable.

There is no evidence that the Portland International Airport controllers had anything to do with the hijacked airliner.

They really don't have to be involved to be involved..a hijacked plane went through there airspace. of course they will watch it..involvement means many things..the crime originated from Portland..interceptor's flew out of Portland. the jump is in there area. key things occurred in there area..

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The T-33 pulling in behind 305 in the Woodland/Ridgefield area then trailing it basically due south would bring the airliner very close to Tena Bar, down along the west of downtown Portland, and ultimately right over the top of Lake Oswego.

What was Ammermann's controller number?  And was he and the rest of the SEA controllers south of Seattle all physically located in the Seattle area?

He was R4.

He took over from R2 just north of the Maylay Intersection. He ended up handing 305 over to R5 (I believe) at about the time everything was happening--meaning the T-33 was pulling in behind 305, the F-106's were being directed further east, and coincidentally DBC jumped. Ammerman told me he made the transfer of his own choice because it was too difficult for him to communicate with everyone while being careful to toggle the switch so as to guarantee that his communication with the military jets wasn't being transmitted to the 305 cockpit because, as Ammerman stated, he didn't know if DBC was in the cockpit.

The Seattle ATC radio transcripts do not list a controller SEA R4.

The transcripts list a SEA R2, SEA R5, SEA R6, and SEA R10.

Perhaps I'm wrong about that--I'd have to check my notes. Maybe he was R5. All I know is that he received his handoff from R2. He then handed 305 off to another controller I want to say about 15 minutes later.

I thot Ammerman was R2. The controller at Eugene R4. ?

Here is what happened.

If you look over the radio transcripts in The Forum Vault you'll note that R2 handed 305 over to Seattle ATC at 7:59PM. You will then note that the transcripts provide no information until R5 takes over at 8:13PM. Therefore, there is a 14 minute gap in the transcripts with nothing at all.

Ammerman told me that what happened here is that R2 handed 305 over to him(R4) at 7:59PM. He then managed 305, the F-106's and the T-33 during this time. Then, at 8:13 he opted to hand 305 off to R5 because it was too difficult for him to manage everything, specifically, trying to communicate with the military jets while being certain to toggle the switch at ATC to make sure that this communication wasn't also being communicated to 305 because he didn't know if Cooper was in the cockpit or not.

Now, the reason that the transcripts do not show any communication with Ammerman (R4) is because the person handling the transcription of the radio communication days later made a mistake. Specifically, when the radio communication was transcribed, the person who handled it did not account for the fact that when 305 was handed off to Ammerman by R2 that 305 stayed at 10K feet in altitude and did not continue up to the higher altitudes as would happen during a normal flight. Therefore because 305 did not exceed 10k feet--Ammerman who was handling mid-level air traffic in Sector 4--handled the airliner as opposed to the person handling the higher level traffic in Sector 4. So, when the transcriber went to review the audio recordings after the R2 hand-off, this person mistakenly looked into the audio files for the air traffic controller handling the higher level traffic and found nothing.

All of this changed, however, when Ammerman made the hand-off to R5 at 8:13PM--coincidentally almost exactly when Cooper jumped.

This is a very good example of how easy it is for mistakes to be made in an investigation like this. Indeed, it is something along these lines that I believe ultimately explains why the FBI Flight Path map is incorrect.

Eric from my interview notes with Cliff I wrote: 'Cliff was a controller at Seattle Center who handled 305 all the way to a slightly beyond PDX on 11-24-71, the evening of.  After Departure control gave over 305 Cliff handled 305. Cliff was not SEAR2 in the NWA transcript.  Cliff says whoever R2 was, R2 would have handed off to R4, who would have handed off to R5 etc.  Seattle Center was one of 22-26 large air control centeres at the time in the US.  Seattle Center was in a building below the tower at SEA-TAC.'

Beyond that I didnt clarify that further.

Ground control and traffic control (Tower) from takeoff and landing where at SEATAC. Ammerman was in Auburn.